FAQS—Voting Machine Technology
What kinds of different voting machines are there in the U.S.?
The country used paper ballots in the 19th century, a system which eventually fell victim to ballot box stuffing. Mechanical lever machines were replaced by punch card systems in the 1960s, a technology that was exposed for its multiple problems during the Florida recount of the 2000 presidential election.
In response to those problems, Congress passed the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA), which encouraged the spread of touch-screen terminals, also known as direct recording electronic voting systems (DRE). In addition to DRE systems, paper ballot optical scan systems and Electronic Ballot Markers (EBM) have become widely used since HAVA was enacted.
What kind of machine do we use in Philadelphia?
Philadelphia County uses Danaher the 1242 ELECTronic voting machine, a DRE, paperless technology.
How does it work?
Voters will face one large screen full of all the candidate selections and ballot questions. Voters select a candidate by pressing the numbered box next to the candidate’s name, which activates a red light indicating the selection. Voters may de-select that choice by pressing the same numbered button again, which turns the red light off. A voter may then make an entirely new selection. The ballot is cast when, at the end of a voter’s selections, he or she presses the green VOTE button on the lower right hand corner of the ballot box. Once the voting booth lights turn off and one bell-chime sounds, the voter’s ballot has been recorded.
How does the machine work for the visually impaired?
As required by HAVA, Philadelphia’s machines were upgraded to include an audio device that consists of a hand-held keypad with headphones to allow visually impaired voters the opportunity to privately and independently cast their ballot.
How long have these machines been used in Philadelphia?
The machines have been used in Philadelphia since May 2002.
What kinds of criteria should election boards use in choosing a particular machine?
According to one group of political scientists, the ideal voting technology would satisfy five attributes: anonymity, scalability, speed, openness to audit, and accuracy.
Why does Philadelphia use this machine?
The Danaher 1242 machine was selected by the City Commissioners (with the recommendation of the Committee of Seventy) because its interface is similar to the mechanical lever machine used previously in the City. Unlike touch-screen DRE systems, the 1242 is “pressure-sensitive” like “a big calculator,” and because a voter’s selected results are viewable on a single page the entire time, a voter never has to change pages. These machines have been running well for about 30 years (in other jurisdictions) and the only problems the Commissioners have experienced are printer paper jams primarily due to human error.
Have there been any problems with this machine in Philadelphia?
One of the strongest criticisms of the 1242 machine is that it does not provide any independent verification during audits of the machines or ballot recounts. Even if the machines produced a paper trail, some say hand-counts are unreliable.
I thought I heard about a lawsuit relating to voting machines in Philadelphia—what is the status of that?
In August 2006, a nonpartisan group of Pennsylvania voters filed a lawsuit against the Secretary of State to halt the use of paperless electronic voting machines. The lawsuit seeks de-certification of DRE machines across the state. In April 2007, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania allowed a continuation of the case. The plaintiffs argue that voters have a right under the state constitution to “reliable and secure voting systems” and can challenge machines “that provide no way for [voters] to know whether their votes will be recognized” through voter verification or independent audit. The Secretary of State has appealed the Commonwealth Court’s decision to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, where a decision in pending. In the meantime, the trial is stayed. (Banfield v. Cortes)
What kinds of machines do other local counties use?
Delaware and Bucks Counties use the Danaher ELECTronic 1242, the same machine used in Philadelphia.
Chester County uses the iVotronic/ES&S Model 100. This type of machine is a DRE with a precinct scanner.
Montgomery County uses the Sequoia AVC Advantage. This type of machine is a DRE.
What does the recent controversy about voting machines have to do with Pennsylvania?
Pennsylvania was recently singled out by The New York Times as a likely hotspot for vote recount problems in the upcoming presidential elections due to conflicts over voting technology. Not only does Pittsburgh use the troubled ES&S iVotronic touch-screen machines, which do not produce paper records, but The New York Times reported that the machines were left largely unattended and unsecured at polling places in a state that could swing blue or red.
Similarly, the systems used in Pennsylvania were criticized in a Harper’s magazine article in 2004. The article noted that five large counties in Pennsylvania representing approximately a quarter of the state’s overall votes (Philadelphia, Montgomery, Dauphin, Berks, and Beaver) will use paperless ballots.
Are there new techologies coming out which will fix past problems?
There are scientists working on new methods and technology for voting machines, but they have not yet been perfected, and there is not a single consensus yet on how the ideal machine will operate.
One new proposal for voting technology combines paper ballots with the Internet. The new method, proposed by Ronald L. Rivest, a computer scientist from MIT, and Warren D. Smith, a mathematician and voting reform advocate, would allow each voter to take home a photocopy of a randomly selected ballot cast by another voter. Results from paper ballots tallied by optical scan or by hand would be posted onto a website, after which voters would receive a receipt showing another voter’s ballot identified only by a serial number. The proponents of this method argue that any form of vote-buying would be avoided as voters would not take home their own receipts, and receipts would not carry any personally identifying information. A voter could, however, verify that the votes recorded on the receipt were cast by checking it against the public website. The two scientists demonstrate that, in order to have 95 percent assurance of detecting a fraud involving 6 percent of ballots, only 50 voters would have to check, no matter the size of the electorate.
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